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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This supplemental brief is filed at the request of the Chief Justice and is
necessary to address this Court's question raised at oral argument, pertaining to the
question of whether Ms. Easley waived her appellate rights in these matters.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously articulated in
the Ar:pellant's Brief and are incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUES
1

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Easley due process and equal protection
when it denied her Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 1

2.

Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the prosecutor to prevent
a district court from considering the placement of a defendant into mental health
court violate Idaho's separation of powers doctrine?

3.

Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the prosecutor to prevent
a district court from considering a defendant as a candidate for mental health
court violate the constitutional requirement that all courts of the same class have
uniform judicial powers, procedures, and practices?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Easley's probation?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further reduce
Ms. Easley's sentences sua sponte upon revoking probation?

1 This brief will only address the waiver issue, which pertains to all of the issues raised
on appeal.

2

ARGUMENT
Ms. Easley Did Not Waiver Her Right To Appeal In Either Case
At oral argument held on December 5, 2013, this Court requested that
Ms. Easley file a supplemental brief to address the appellate waivers contained in the
plea agreements in both cases.
In the written plea agreement in docket number 39710, Ms. Easley agreed to
waive the right to appeal her "judgment of guilty pursuant to CR 11 (d)." (R., p.60.) This
waiver is retrospective in nature and did not preclude her from appealing from the order
revoking probation. Support for this proposition can be found in State v. Thomas, 146
Idaho 592, 593-94 (2008), where this Court held that an "order revoking probation is not
a judgment." As such, the plain language of Ms. Easley's waiver in docket number
39710 only pertained to issues related to the original judgment and not any postconviction orders, such as the order revoking probation which is currently on appeal.
In the written plea agreement in docket number 39711, Ms. Easley agreed to
waive her right to appeal certain issues. The specific language of that waiver follows:
By accepting this offer the defendant waives the right to: (1) file a
Rule 35 Motion (except as to an illegal sentence) and (2) appeal any issue
regarding the conviction, including all matters involving the plea or the
sentencing and any rulings made by the court. Including all suppression
issues. However, the defendant may appeal the sentence if the Court
exceeds the fixed portion of the State's sentencing recommendation of the
"Jail/Prison" terms set forth above.
(R., p.345.) This Court recently interpreted an appellate waiver with virtually identical
language. In State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 (2013), the following waiver was at issue:
By accepting this offer the Defendant waives the right to appeal any
issues regarding the conviction, including all matters involving the plea or
sentencing and any rulings made by the courl, including all suppression
issues. Excepting however the Defendant may appeal the sentence if the
Court exceeds the State's sentencing recommendation of the 'Jail/Prison
terms' set forth above.
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Id. at. 886 (original emphasis). In that case, a restitution order was on appeal and the

State argued, based on the foregoing waiver, that Straub had waived the right to appeal
the restitution order. Id. at 886-887. The Idaho Supreme Court employed the following
rationale in rejecting the State's argument:
[TJhe word "made," as the past tense form of the verb "to make," refers to
any rulings that the district court made prior to the agreement. Thus, the
agreement neither contemplates nor has any effect on rulings that
occurred after the plea agreement was reached. Since the restitution
hearing and subsequent restitution order occurred after the plea
agreement was signed, Straub has not waived his right to appeal the
restitution order.
Id. at 887. The waiver language in this case uses the word "made" and, therefore, the

agreement does not contemplate a waiver of any future rulings made by the district
court, such as an order revoking probation, which is at issue on this appeal.
Therefore, Ms. Easley did not waive her right to appeal the district court's order revoking
probation.
Ms. Easley also argues, in the alternative, that the State missed its opportunity to
assert that she waived her right to appeal. In Oneida v. Oneida, 95 Idaho 105 (1972),
this Court held that the respondent in an appeal must file a motion to dismiss, prior to
the filing of the appellate briefing, if it hopes to obtain dismissal of the appellant's appeal

based on a waiver of appellate rights:
Relying upon the above-quoted oral stipulation, the respondents contend
that the appellants waived their right to appeal the district court's order. As
the appellants correctly point out, however, an objection based upon such
a stipulation should be raised by a motion to dismiss the appeal. Southern
Indiana Power Co. v. Cook, 182 Ind. 505, 107 N.E. 12 (1914); Speeth v.
Fields, 71 N.E.2d 149 (Ohio App.1946) (per curiam); 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal
and Error s 240 (1962); see Phelps v. Blome, 150 Neb. 547, 35 N.W.2d 93
(1948); cf. 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error s 241 (1962). Raising such an
objection at the earliest stage of appellate proceedings may spare the
appellant further useless expenditures (for, e.g., an appeal bond,
transcripts, and additional attorneys' fees). Having failed to move to
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dismiss the appeal, the respondents are in no position to rely, in their
appellate brief, upon the alleged waiver of the right to appeal.
Id. at 106-07 (footnotes omitted). As such, the State forfeited its ability to raise this as

an issue on appeal.
In sum, both of the waivers in this case only relate to the original judgments of
conviction in both cases and do not encompass the orders revoking probation which are
currently on appeal.

Alternatively, the State missed its opportunity to argue for the

dismissal of this appeal.

CONCLUSION
Since Ms. Easley did not waive the ability to appeal from the district court's
orders revoking probation in both cases, she respectfully requests access to the
requested transcripts and the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental
briefing raiSing issues which arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is
denied, Ms. Easley respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with
instructions to consider placement into the Fifth Judicial District's mental health court.
Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with
instructions to place her on probation. Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests
that this Court reduce the length of the indeterminate portion of her sentences.
Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of her
sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 1ih day of December, 2013.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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